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Abstract
As a result of the allocation of emissions reductions, and the differential willingness of countries to ratify, it turns out
that Russia is a central player in the Kyoto Protocol. With the U.S. out and Japan and the EU ratifying, the Protocol
cannot enter into force without Russian ratification. In part, U.S. rejection of the Kyoto Protocol resulted from the
fact that, had the U.S. been in, its least costly road to implementation would have involved large purchases of emissions
credits from Russia. With the U.S. out, Russian credits are worth much less but Russia may be able to exploit monopoly
power to increase the value of those permits, or Russia could bank permits on the expectation that prices will rise in
the future, perhaps as a result of the U.S. reentry into the Protocol in later periods. The Russian decision is more
complex, however, in that it is also a major fossil fuel exporter. To the extent it withholds permits from the market,
fossil energy prices are depressed further, and the value of its exports of energy are reduced. Thus, Russia faces a tradeoff
between maximizing its permit revenue and its revenue from fossil energy exports. We develop this problem as a simple
dynamic optimization problem and calibrate the model to the results of two CGE models (EPPA and GEMINI-E3) that
fully capture interactions of energy trade, permit trade, and permit and energy prices. We show that carbon prices are
relatively insensitive to Russia’s behaviors when the U.S. is assumed to participate. It also shows that, in the absence of
U.S. participation, the impact of market power by Russia and Ukraine is largely dependent on the elasticity of demand
for permits. Finally, we focus on the uncertainty about the supply of CDM by developing countries. It is shown that
permit prices are relatively insensitive to CDM supply in the short run but not in the long run.
JEL Classification: Q4, Q3, C68, D58.
Keywords: Climate Change; Kyoto Protocol; Russia; Computable General Equilibrium Model; Emis-
sion Trading.
1 Introduction
Russia has become a central player in international climate policy. For the Kyoto Protocol to enter
into force, Annex B Parties accounting for 55% of 1990 carbon emissions must ratify. The Russian
Federation accounted for 16.4% of 1990 carbon emissions. Thus, with U.S. indicating it will not ratify,
and alone responsible for almost 34% of 1990 emissions, Russian ratification is necessary for entry into
force. With the EC, Japan, and other smaller countries having already ratified, Russian ratification
is sufficient. Other countries where ratification may not succeed, can neither assure nor block entry
into force. The Russian allocation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions under the Kyoto Protocol also
seems to have figured in the U.S. rejection of the Kyoto Protocol. The U.S. President Bush rejected
the Protocol as “fatally flawed.” One concern expressed by the U.S. Administration was that the U.S.
would need to rely on untested flexibility mechanisms, like permit trading and CDM, to make the U.S.
costs of meeting the Protocol acceptable. Studies of the Kyoto Protocol show that the availability of
Russian “hot air”, as well as further low cost real reductions there, and in other transition economies
like Poland, greatly reduce the price of carbon and welfare impacts in the U.S. compared with a no
trading case. Depending on whether the Kyoto Parties use trading flexibility and whether the U.S.
joins or not, Russia’s gains from permit sales could range from billions of dollars to almost nothing.
In this context, the Russian Federation, perhaps acting with other potential sellers such as Ukraine,
has a heightened incentive to adopt monopolistic behavior, and sell only a share of available permits
from the “hot air” in order to maximize revenues from permits sales. The incentive for monopoly
behavior by the Russian Federation and Ukraine has been analyzed elsewhere, both before (Burniaux,
1998; Bernstein, et al, 1999) and after the withdrawal of the U.S. from the Kyoto Protocol1. With the
U.S. in the Protocol, estimates of the international trading price with optimal monopolistic behavior
by Russia and Ukraine increases on the order of 38% (Burniaux, 1998) to 43% (Bernstein et al, 1999).
The trading price in these studies is, in turn, nearly three times the domestic marginal cost in the
Russia, reflecting the fact that Russia would then undertake much less real domestic reduction. Recent
studies (Babiker et al, 2002; Bernard and Vielle, 2001; Blanchard and Criqui, 2002; Bohringer, 2001;
Ciorna et al, 2001; den Elzen and de Moor, 2001; Manne and Richels, 2001) have also considered
Russian monopoly power with the withdrawal of the U.S. The studies generally find that it is optimal
for Russia and Ukraine to sell only about 50% of the “hot air” available, with the equilibrium price of
permits ranging from $20 to $57 per ton of carbon.
Three key issues arise in considering Russia’s strategy on permit sales should it ratify the Kyoto
Protocol. First, one of the key findings of CGE modeling of greenhouse gas mitigation is that climate
policy can have strong effect on welfare for some countries through a terms of trade effect. The main
effect occurs through international fossil energy prices. As oil and gas are a major source of export
revenue for the Russia, this effect is potentially important in evaluating an optimal strategic response
by them. Essentially, by restricting carbon permits sales, Russia would force greater reductions of
energy use in the other Annex B countries. This, in turn, would cause a greater reduction in the
international producer price of fossil fuels than without the permit sales restrictions. Russia would
thus face a loss of export revenue due both to declining quantity and price of oil and gas exports. The
optimal decision is thus a tradeoff between increasing gains from permits sales and reductions in oil
and gas revenue.
Second, it may be in the interest of Parties to bank permits for use in future periods, and such
banking is allowed under the terms of the Kyoto Protocol. In the simplest case, banking would be
desirable if, absent banking, the permit price was expected to rise at greater than the discount rate.
It would then make sense to hold back sales of permits (reduce emissions further in earlier periods) to
slow the rate of permit rise to the discount rate. In this regard emissions permits are a scarce resource
1Due to lack of data needed to disaggregate the Former Soviet Union (FSU) nearly all studies investigate the behavior
of FSU.
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and the problem is to optimally allocate them over time. Thus, similar to the oil market, observed
prices for permits may include both “Hotelling” scarcity rents, reflecting Parties’ interests in allocating
permits over time, and monopoly rents reflecting the exercise of monopoly power by some Parties.
That is, the failure of Russia to sell all of its permits, would not by itself be evidence of the exercise
of monopoly power but could reflect a decision to bank based on its expectations of future demand.
Third, even if Russia has some monopoly power in the markets for tradable emissions permits,
this power might be weakened by competition with other flexibility mechanisms such as the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM). Annex B countries will make trade-offs between the two options,
according to their comparative costs. If the net cost of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) generated
through CDM projects is less expensive than emissions permits available in the international emissions
trading market, Annex B regions will prefer to buy CERs. At the equilibrium, the marginal costs will
be equalized, and the “supply” of CDM will be determined.
To the extent previous studies have found similar or different results, the reasons for these similar-
ities or differences are not immediately obvious. In some cases, the focus has been on banking and in
others on monopoly rents. Several have looked at the purely static, one period problem of maximizing
rents whereas others have considered the problem in a dynamic CGE context2. Not all analyses to date
have included the terms of trade effects, and different models can give rise to different results solely
because of different assumptions about abatement opportunities. In this paper, we seek to clarify the
source of differences in results. We develop a simplified dynamic model whose parameters can be set
to reflect the underlying structure of more complex models. In so doing, we can better explain the
conditions under which there is, or is not, room for substantial monopoly and Hotelling rents to be
earned by permit sellers. Moreover, we explicitly consider the tradeoff between oil and gas revenue
and permit revenue.
We simulate an international trading regime characterized by a monopolistic behavior by Russia
and Ukraine. Two profit-maximization schemes are successively assessed, a static one and an inter-
temporal one. The latter considers the time horizon through 2040. Following a previous study by
Bernard and Vielle (2002), the simulations are implemented through a recursive dynamic inter-temporal
optimization calibrated on two Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models (EPPA and GEMINI-
E3). Beside the working of the carbon market – including the competition from other flexibility
mechanisms, in particular the CDM, – the optimization program simulates the behavior of the other
Annex B regions in the emissions markets, and the effects on their income and terms of trade.
In section 2, we present the Russian position in the context of climate change mitigation. In section
3, we present the general formulation of the inter-temporal optimization model. Section 4 deals with
the calibration of the model to the outcomes of the two CGE models. Numerical results are discussed
and compared in section 5. Section 6 presents the sensitivity of numerical results to the amount of
CDM available. Section 7 concludes.
2 Russia’s position on Kyoto Protocol ratification
As of May 2003, to enter into force the Kyoto Protocol requires only the ratification of the Russian
Federation. Russian Premier Minister Mikhail Kasyanov announced at the 2002 Earth Summit in
Johannesburg that Russia hoped to ratify the Kyoto Protocol “in the very near future.” However,
since then the issue of Russian ratification has become less clear. What is clear is that the decision
about ratification (or not) will be based on economic and foreign policy considerations. Environmental
reasons will have little impact on the Russian position.
The main attraction for Russia is a potential for sales of “hot air”, a situation when emission quotas
appear to be in excess of Russian anticipated emissions due to economic downturn of the 90s (Victor
2See the analysis done by Manne and Richels (2001) with MERGE that considers banking explicitly.
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et al, 1998; Paltsev, 2000; Bohringer, 2000). In the post-Kyoto negotiations, the European Union
opposed the sale of “hot air” because of a stated preference for higher domestic abatement activities,
even submitting a proposal (UNFCCC, 1999) for limits on the share of emissions reductions a country
might obtain through use of emission trading. With the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto, the EU has
toned down the opposition to the “hot air” sales. However, there are some indications that the EU,
Canada, and Japan may decide not to buy “hot air” permits.
Even if “hot air” is for sale, the exact amount is not certain and depends on the pace of Russian
economic recovery. The expected reduction of the world carbon emissions due to the Kyoto activities
is around 300-350 MtC, while the “hot air” estimates range from 150 to 500 MtC (Paltsev, 2000).
Russian national estimates can be found in the Second National Communication (UNFCCC, 1998),
which projects 2010 emissions at 90-92% of the 1990 level. Also, Kotov (2002) reports that in the official
forecast by Russian Ministry of Fuel and Energy, emissions from the energy sector are forecasted at
85% of the 1990 level. He notes that this forecast is based on an assumption of an extremely high
growth in energy efficiency rates. However, the U.S. DOE (2002) is substantially less optimistic about
Russian economic recovery and projects the 2010 emissions from the former Soviet Union at only 72%
of the 1990 level.
It should be noted that Russia is a major but not the sole potential seller of “hot air”. Emissions
in 1990 from the economies of transition were as follows: Russia 650 MtC, Ukraine 190 MtC, Eastern
Europe 300 MtC. Most of the projections show that in 2010 these emissions will reach 470-600 MtC
for Russia, 140-170 MtC for Ukraine, and 230-260 for Eastern Europe. It leaves an estimated 50-180
MtC of Russian, 20-70 MtC of Ukrainian, and 40-70 MtC of Eastern European “hot air”. Each of
these players have different political and economic agendas regarding their excess permits. Eastern
European countries, for the most part, are likely to be absorbed into the system through their accession
to the EU. Russia and Ukraine are then left as the most likely sellers of “hot air”.
Inside Russia environmental concerns are not among the top priorities. People are rather worried
about unemployment, poverty, a sharp decrease in the standards of living, and day-to-day survival.
The public perception of climate policy is that global warming is not so bad for cold Russia and that
the economic compensation from the West for the years of transition from communism is justified.
The Russian government also did not put climate policy at the top of its list. The Interdepartmental
Commission on Climate Change (ICCC) originally was headed by Hydromet (Meteorological Commit-
tee), a government body which does not have a status of a ministry. There also has been a clear lack
of financing of climate policy research and institutional capacity building. For example, in 1996-2000
the federal program on climate change was funded only for 3-4% of required resources (Kotov and
Nikitina, 2002).
However, with the prospects of a windfall from “hot air” sales, much more important players
entered the arena. In 1999, the Ministry of Fuel and Energy proposed an institutional structure for
climate policy (Kotov, 2002). According to this proposal, the rank of the ICCC would be raised,
the carbon permits market managed at the federal level with individual enterprises excluded from
the direct access to the international permit market, and bi-lateral cooperation with other countries
would be emphasized. In 2000 the ICCC was shifted from the hands of Hydromet to the Ministry of
Economic Development and Trade, a move which shows an increased importance of climate policy in
the bureaucratic hierarchy. Russian development so far is based on a reliable fuel and energy sector.
The energy lobby is very powerful in Russian politics and the Kyoto ratification depends on their
support. There is a clear conflict between climate policy goals and energy exporters’ goals because
of a potential negative impact on the world prices of oil, gas, and coal. It should be noted that the
Russian energy lobby has expressed an interest in joint implementation projects only if such projects
would lead to investment in the energy sector, rather than payments for “hot air” made to the Russian
government. It is clear that if Russia cannot secure buyers of “hot air” or investors to the energy
sector, then Russia is unlikely to hurry to ratify the Kyoto.
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Even if the economic interests of energy groups are satisfied and Russia decides to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol, that process is time consuming. To bring the law into force, the Russian government must
first prepare a draft of the National Report on Climate Change and send it to the State Duma. The
Duma must then approve ratification of the Protocol. The Federation Council, the upper Chamber of
the Russian Parliament, then must also approve ratification. Finally, the law is passed to the President,
who can sign it or decline it. Depending on political will, this process may take several months.
Given the reality of the Russian political system and the diverse interests of its constituencies,
Russia may or may not ratify, use monopoly power or choose to optimally bank permits. Moreover,
the underlying structure of the CGE models we use, require us to assume that Russia and Ukraine
cooperate, and this may be unrealistic. Nevertheless, the model and calculations that follow are
illustrative of the potential gains that could accrue if these strategic behaviors are followed.
3 The model
In this section we present a model for the general case of inter-temporal optimization, and derive from
it the case of myopic behavior. Our notation is given below, with index t representing time, from 0 to
T .
Notations
H¯At : available “hot air” (tC)
qt : emissions abatement by Russia and Ukraine (tC)
dt : demand for flexible instruments by other Annex B countries (tC)
st : abatement realized through the CDM mechanism (tC)
vt : permits sold by Russia and Ukraine ( = dt − st )
pt : price of permits ($/tC)
rt : revenues from the sales of permits ( = ptvt )
ct : abatement cost in Russia and Ukraine ($)
gt : gains from Terms of Trade (or change from a reference situation) ($)
πt : social value of the held over stock of permits
St : stock of permits of Russia and Ukraine available at the beginning of year t
ST+1 : residual stock of permits of Russia and Ukraine at the end of year T
pT+1 : unit value of permits at the end of year T
i : discount rate (assumed constant over time)
The inter-temporal optimization program for Russia and Ukraine can then be written in the form:
max

 ∑
t=1,T
e−it
[
rt + gt(pt)− ct(qt)
]
+ e−i T+1pT+1ST+1

 (1)
where the rt term represents revenues from permit trade, the gt term captures the welfare effects on
Russia through the terms of trade (mainly fossil energy price) effects3, and ct is an abatement cost in
3The gains from terms of trade are directly computed in the CGE model using the following definition:
gt =
∑
(x1j − x0j )Xj −
∑
(m1j −m0j )Mj
where x0j , x
1
j , m
0
j , and m
1
j are respectively the exports and imports prices of good j in the baseline and policy case, and
where Xj and Mj are respectively the volume of exports and imports in the baseline scenario. Gains from Terms of Trade
is thus the change in net revenues of foreign trade resulting from the change in the prices of imports and exports (ex-ante,
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Russia and Ukraine. The last term, e−i(T+1)pT+1ST+1, represents the value of the stock of permits
carried into T + 1.
The following constraints are applied in the optimization program:
(πt) St+1 − St − qt − H¯A(rt) + dt(pt)− st(pt) = 0
with S1 = 0
(µt) St ≥ 0
(µT+1) ST+1 ≥ 0
(θt) qt ≥ 0
where πt, µt , µt+1, θt are the Lagrangian multipliers associated each of the constraints. The first
constraint describes the accumulation of permits over time, that is the stock of permits in t+1 is equal
to the stock in period t plus abatement, “hot air”, and CDM, less purchases of permits from Russia
and Ukraine by other Annex B countries. The other constraints represent initial stock of permits
and non-negativity conditions. Resolution of the optimization program yields the Kuhn & Tucker
conditions for optimality:
(pt) πt
[
∂dt
∂pt
− ∂st
∂pt
− ∂H¯At
∂rt
∂rt
∂pt
]
= e−it
[
∂rt
∂pt
+
∂gt
∂pt
]
with
∂rt
∂pt
= pt
(
∂dt
∂pt
− ∂st
∂pt
)
+ dt(pt)− st(pt)
(St) −πt + πt−1 + µt = 0
with µt ∈
{
{0} if St > 0
]−∞, 0] if St = 0
(ST+1) πT+1 + µT+1 = e−i(T+1)pT+1
with µT+1 ∈
{
{0} if ST+1 > 0
]−∞, 0] if ST+1 = 0
(qt) πt = e−it
∂ct
∂qt
+ θt
with θt ∈
{
{0} if qt > 0
]−∞, 0] if qt = 0
If the non-negativity constraint on the stock of permits is not binding, the discounted social value
πt is constant over time4. The supply of permits and the level of emissions abatement are determined
by the two decision variables: (pt) and (qt). The relationship describing the optimal level of pt may be
written in the form:
before domestic demand for imports and exports to other countries adjust to the new prices). Note that this simplified
formula applies because both CGE models used here close their foreign sector by assuming a fixed (across cases) capital
flow. For more on computation of the gains from terms of trade see Bernard and Vielle (2003).
4Equivalent, in the present case, to the Hotelling law.
6
πte
it = pt
1 + ηt
1− ζt − 11+εt
(2)
with
εt =
pt
vt
∂vt
∂pt
(price elasticity of permits demand)
ηt =
∂gt
∂rt
(effect of permits revenues on the gains from terms of trade)
ζt = pt
∂HAt
∂rt
(effect of permits revenues on “hot air”)
Relationship (2) is the general case for intertemporal monopoly. The optimality condition for the
myopic monopolistic behavior can be seen by noting that in such a case the social value of permits
held over for next period is zero by definition, i.e., the value of banking is not considered. One can
further see that if we were to neglect the macroeconomic effects of permit revenue on emissions (and
thus “hot air”), ηt = 0, and the effects on the terms of trade, ζt = 0, then relationship (2) reduces
to the condition that the price elasticity of demand equals minus one, the familiar partial equilibrium
condition for a monopoly. Elasticity of demand seen by Russia takes into account the competition by
CDM supply. Greater competition from the CDM mechanism means a decrease of the monopolistic
power of Russia.
The relationship describing the optimal abatement level, qt is
(qt)
∂ct
∂qt
≥ πteit with equality if qt > 0 (3)
which sets the marginal abatement cost equal to the social value of permits.
4 Calibration of the model with two CGEs
Estimation of the functions appearing in the optimization model is carried out using simulation results
of the two CGE models, EPPA (Babiker et al, 2001) and GEMINI-E3 (Bernard and Vielle, 2000).
Specifically, we simulated each of these models across a wide range of carbon constraints so that
the resultant fitted response functions capture model behavior over the full range of results we later
evaluate with our dynamic simulation model.
The Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model is a recursive dynamic multi-regional
general equilibrium model of the world economy that has been developed for analysis of climate change
policy. Previous versions of the model have been used extensively for this purpose (e.g., Ellerman and
Decaux, 1998; Jacoby and Sue Wing, 1999; Reilly et al, 1999; Babiker et al, 2000; Ellerman and
Wing, 2000). A specific version of the model (EPPA-EU) including a detailed breakdown of the
European Union and incorporating an industry and a household transport sectors for each region has
been developed (Viguier et al, 2001; Babiker et al, 2001). EPPA is built on a comprehensive energy-
economy data set (GTAP-E5) that accommodates a consistent representation of energy markets in
physical units as well as detailed accounts of regional production and bilateral trade flows. The base
year for the model is 1995 and it is solved recursively at 5-year intervals. The version of EPPA used here
includes some recent updates beyond that described in Babiker et al (2002). For example, it includes
5For description of the GTAP database see Hertel (1997).
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endogenous estimation of the cost of abatement of non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions CH4, N2O,
HFCs, PFCs and SF6. For comparability with GEMINI-E3, however, we considered only a constraint
on carbon emissions to develop the response functions estimated here. Other revised features of this
model include greater detail in the electricity sector so that fossil, nuclear, hydro, biomass, solar,
and wind electric generation are explicitly treated; reevaluation of fossil energy resources, improved
representation of recent developments in Chinese energy use, and reevaluation of trends in energy
efficiency improvements. Among the developed countries and Russia, the focus of analysis here, the
energy efficiency of the electric sector is modeled as improving at a rate of 0.40 to 0.45 percent per
year while non-electric sectors increase in energy efficiency by 1.2 to 1.3 percent per year.
GEMINI-E3 is a multi-country, multi-sector, dynamic General Equilibrium Model incorporating
a highly detailed representation of indirect taxation (Bernard and Vielle, 2000; Bernard and Vielle,
2003). For assessment of energy policies directly involving the electric sector, e.g., implementation
of nuclear programs, the model can incorporate a technological sub-model of power generation better
suited for comparing investments in different types of plants. We use the third version of the model
that has been especially designed to calculate the social marginal abatement costs (MAC), i.e., the
welfare loss of a unit increase in pollution abatement. Beside a comprehensive description of indirect
taxation (mainly for France), the model simulates all relevant markets: markets for commodities
(through relative prices), for labor (through wages), for domestic and international savings (through
rates of interest and exchange rates). Terms of trade (i.e., transfers of real income between countries
resulting from variations of relative prices of imports and exports), and “real” exchange rates, can then
be measured6.
The functions we estimate based on the CGE models are:
- the demand for flexible instruments by non Annex B countries (other than Russia and Ukraine, and
including or not the U.S. according to the case), i.e., what these countries are globally willing to
purchase at a given price (or, symmetrically, what they are willing to pay for a given amount of
flexible instruments, either emission permits or CDM);
- the supply of CDM, i.e., the amount of CDM projects (measured in terms of yearly emission abate-
ment) which are profitable, for both contracting Annex B and non-Annex B countries, as a
function of the price of permits;
- the marginal abatement costs curves in Russia and Ukraine, as a function of the price of permits;
- the relationship between the gains from terms of trade (GTT) for Russia and Ukraine and the price of
permits or the revenues from permits sales by Russia and Ukraine. This relationship summarizes
the spillover macro-economic impacts on Russia of the climate change policies implemented in
the rest of the world. Much of this effect is due to revenue loss from energy sales because of
reduced demand for fossil fuels as deeper cuts in CO2 are required if less “hot air” is available.
4.1 The demand for flexible instruments
Figure 1 represents the demand curves for flexible instruments in 2010 and 2040 computed with EPPA
and GEMINI-E3 with and without the U.S. participation to the Kyoto Protocol. An important dif-
ference between these two models is that GEMINI-E3 does not include Eastern European countries
whereas the EPPA model includes all of these countries in its EET region and as part of Annex B.
The estimated demands used in the simulations reported in the following sections of the paper reflect
6The real exchange rate between two countries is the relative price of the “nume´raires” chosen in each country (and
usually based on a basket of goods representative of GDP). It is not identical to the monetary exchange rate of the
currencies of the two countries: in particular, the real exchange rate can evolve between countries belonging to the same
monetary union.
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this different country coverage, and are shown as solid lines in Figure 1. Also shown for the “without
the US” case is a separate line showing the demand from the EPPA model excluding the Eastern
European countries from the Annex B trading block. It shows that this difference in country coverage
is one reason for the differences between the models. Specifically, EPPA simulates “hot air” from these
countries in 2010 of about 20 million tons of carbon. With this “hot air” removed, Annex B demand
based on EPPA is shifted horizontally to the right which has the effect of raising the demand at any
given price. This adjustment makes the EPPA demand generally more similar to that of GEMINI-E3
at quantities less than 150 MtC, although demand from GEMINI-E3 is more steeply sloped.
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Figure 1: Demand for flexible instruments by Annex B except Russia and Ukraine (with and without
U.S.)
With the US included in the Kyoto Protocol, Annex B demand as estimated from EPPA is greater
than GEMINI-E3 demand by more than 200 MtC at any price, even with the EET’s “hot air” included
in the EPPA demand. This reflects more rapid baseline growth of emissions in EPPA. Removing the
EET from the “with US” estimated demands from EPPA would have the same effect as removing it
from the “without US” demand, shifting the demand horizontally to the right by the approximately
the same quantity. It would thus increase the EPPA demand by another 50 to 100 MtC. The relative
magnitude of the shift is much less, however, because the quantity demanded when the US is included
in Annex B demand is greater by about by 300 to 400 MtC then when the US is not part of Kyoto. It
is also important to recognize that these estimates do not include forest and agricultural sinks, which
9
if included would reduce these demands7.
4.2 MAC curves for Russia and Ukraine
Marginal abatement curves are derived by setting progressively tighter abatement levels and recording
the resulting shadow price of carbon or by introducing progressively higher carbon taxes and recording
the quantity of abated emissions. As explained by Ellerman and Decaux (1998), a computable general
equilibrium (CGE) model can produce a “shadow price” for any constraint on carbon emissions for a
given region R at time T. A MAC curve plots the shadow prices corresponding to a different level of
emissions reduction.
Figure 2 shows MAC curves for Russia and Ukraine estimated in EPPA and GEMINI-E3. They
have been plotted as a function of the amount of reduction below reference emissions. We can see that
the marginal costs of reducing carbon emissions by a given level are very similar in the two models.
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Figure 2: MAC curves in Russia & Ukraine
These curves leave out the amount of “hot air” available to Russia and Ukraine in the 2010-2040
period. The amount of Russian “hot air” is far from being certainly established as it depends on,
among other things, how GDP rapidly recovers. In the EPPA model, the “hot air” is projected to
decline from 186 MtC in 2010 to 41 MtC in 2020 whereas it goes from 300 MtC in 2010 to 136 MtC
in 2030 in GEMINI-E3. We base our results on the EPPA estimates of the Russian “hot air”.
4.3 Curves of CDM supply
The last component of the model is the supply of CDM credits. Very few studies have assessed the
potential of this flexibility mechanism. The ultimate potential of CDM is the total amount of GHG
abatement in non Annex B countries at a cost less than or equal to the equilibrium price of permits.
Few analysts expect this full potential will be realized.
With the rules yet still incomplete, estimates of CDM supply are highly speculative. If fairly strict
conditions of eligibility exist, and (as anticipated) case-by-case evaluation is required to certify them,
7In the final Marrakech agreement, the Annex B parties (excluding Russia) were allowed a total of about 35 MtC of
sinks, and this would reduce their demands by this amount at all prices, and Russia was allocated 33 MtC of sinks. Due
to its withdrawal from the negotiations there is no such agreed sink allowance for the US but prior to withdrawal the
sinks allowance being discussed was 50 to 75 MtC.
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high transaction costs are likely, and the actual supply may be a small share of the total “hot air”; i.e.,
5 to 10% or even less. We parameterize supply using a convenient “yardstick”: the amount of CDM
(in terms of carbon emissions abated) profitable in 2010 at 100 dollars8. The central estimate we used
for this benchmark was 100 MtC. Sensitivity scenarios were performed with the assumptions of 0, 50,
and 150 millions tons of carbon. The equation used in the model is the following:
St = (1 + δ)t−2010α
√
pt
100
(4)
where α represents the CDM parameter, and δ the annual growth of the CDM per year parameterized
in this paper to 2.5%/year.
5 Scenarios and numerical results
We consider the “Kyoto forever” case where the Kyoto targets for 2008-2012 are retained through the
end of the simulation period. We consider only abatement of fossil CO2 emissions (excluding sinks and
non CO2 GHGs) for the following scenarios: (1) the U.S. in the Protocol, (2) the situation as it now
exists with the U.S. out, and (3) cases where the potential of CDM is modified. For each of these, we
first consider the competitive case where Russia and Ukraine do not restrict their supply of “hot air”.
Then, we assess the case where Russia and Ukraine act as a “myopic” monopoly, and maximize their
revenues at each period of time. Finally, the case of inter-temporal monopolistic behavior is evaluated.
We assume a discount rate of 5% and a final stock of permits of zero9.
5.1 Russia’s strategy in the market for tradable emissions permits
As shown in Figure 3, in the case when the U.S is in the Kyoto Protocol, the competitive price in 2010
is $80/tC for the EPPA model results. This rises to $97/tC under the myopic monopoly results, and to
$117/tC when Russia and Ukraine intertemporally optimize. The corresponding prices for GEMINI-E3
are $53/tC, $69/tC, and $83/tC. The myopic monopolistic prices are lower than the inter-temporal
monopolistic prices in the short term (2010-2015), and higher in the long term (2030-2040).
Not surprisingly, carbon prices tend to be higher with EPPA than with GEMINI-E3. Since the
amount of “hot air” is exogenously set and MAC curves for Russia and Ukraine are very similar in the
two models, this result is explained by the demand for flexible instruments derived from the models.
Indeed, we saw that EPPA gives higher demand than GEMINI-E3 for the whole period of time (see
Figure 1).
In Figure 4, we can see that the amount of permits supplied by Russia and Ukraine depends on
the behavioral assumption. When Russia and Ukraine are allowed to behave strategically, they have
an interest in restricting their supply of permits and to bank them. The sales of permits by Russia
are always higher in the competitive case compared to the monopolistic scenarios. In the competitive
and myopic monopolistic cases, the supply of permits by Russia is fairly stable other time. This is not
true in the inter-temporal monopolistic case where Russia banks some permits in order to maximize
its trading gains. This result is observed with the two models, although Russia banks more permits
with EPPA since carbon prices increase more rapidly in the long run than in GEMINI-E3.
The most immediately noticeable effect of the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol is that it
has a depressing impact on the price of carbon permits (Figure 5). Both models show this negative
effect of demand reduction on the trading market, although the detailed results coming from the two
8The curve is then completed assuming a function of power 1/2. For latter period, it is assumed than the potential at
100$ increases at the rate of world growth, 2.5 % a year.
9The results may be sensitive to how the terminal conditions are specified. In tests, not reported here, the results
were not sensitive to reasonable assumptions regarding these conditions.
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Figure 3: Price of permits depending on Russia’s behavior (U.S. in) – EPPA (left) versus GEMINI-E3
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models differ more sharply than in the previous scenario. In the short run, modeling results based on
EPPA and GEMINI-E3 are similar when the market is assumed to be perfectly competitive. Carbon
prices tend to rise more rapidly in EPPA than in GEMINI-E3 in the different scenarios. Indeed, the
quantity of carbon permits demanded is higher in EPPA than in GEMINI-E3 even at this relatively
high level of carbon price.
The other noticeable result is that the effects of strategic behavior on the carbon price are much
greater in both models with the U.S. out (Figure 5). Permit sales are restricted considerably, in
particular in the nearer term (Figure 6).
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Figure 5: Price of permits depending on Russian behavior (U.S. out) – EPPA (left) versus GEMINI-E3
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Figure 6: Supply of permits by Russia and Ukraine (U.S. out) – EPPA (left) versus GEMINI-E3 (right)
5.2 Terms of trade and welfare impacts
Previous studies have emphasized the impact of climate policies on the terms of trade (Babiker et
al, 2000; Babiker et al, 2001; Bernard and Vielle, 2002). In this section we focus on the terms of
trade effect introduced in Section 3. The carbon constraint has a favorable terms of trade effect for
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countries importing energy, whose price declines as a result of energy demand contraction. Being a
large exporter of energy, Russia may see its terms of trade negatively impacted by the implementation
of the Kyoto Protocol. Russia’s position may be improved by emissions trading, however. It gains
not only from the sale of permits but also from a lower constraint on energy demand in other OECD
countries. Thus, Russia faces a trade-off between energy revenues and permits revenues. On one hand,
Russia can maximize its trading gains by banking permits. On the other hand, restricting emissions
permit sales induces losses from lower energy prices.
Welfare and terms of trade (the weighted price of exports divided by the weighted price of imports)
impacts have been computed in GEMINI-E3. For comparison, four scenarios are simulated: 1) Kyoto
without trading, 2) Kyoto with competitive trading, 3) Kyoto with myopic behavior on the emission
trading market, 4) Kyoto with intertemporal behavior on the emission trading market.
As expected, we can see in Figure 7 that the terms of trade tend to deteriorate in Russia, and that
welfare is reduced, when Kyoto is implemented without flexibility. Things are radically different when
Russia is allowed to sell emissions permits to other Annex B regions. In that policy case, terms of trade
are improved in Russia compared to the baseline scenario. This change is the result of two main effects.
First, as suggested before, the depressing impact of the Kyoto Protocol on world energy demand and
prices might be reduced by emissions trading in general, and “hot air” trading in particular. Second,
domestic prices tend to rise in Russia since emissions abatement is higher. As shown in Figure 8, the
same phenomenon occurs when the US is out of the Protocol. But welfare gains from emissions trading
are reduced since permit demand and prices are lower. The incentive for Russia to restrict its supply
of permits in order to sustain permits prices is thus higher.
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Figure 7: Welfare (Left) and terms of trade (Right) effects with the US in
In general, the Kyoto Protocol has an ambiguous effect on the Russia’s terms of trade. The
relevant prices that are most affected by the policy variants are energy export prices and the carbon
price. Without permit trade the carbon price does not enter Russia’s terms of trade calculation. With
trading the carbon price represents a major improvement for Russian export sector. Thus, we see that
without emission trading the terms of trade deteriorates because of a decrease in fossil-fuel prices and
that they improve with trading. Prices of other exports and imports will change as well, but these
changes tend to be smaller. Over time the net effect on the terms of trade depends on the relative rise
of the carbon price compared to the decline in the world energy prices, with the shareweight varying
with exports.
Compared to the no trading case, the welfare gains to Russia are $389 billion over the entire period
in the competitive case, $406 billion in the myopic case and $411 billion in the intertemporal monopoly
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case (with GEMINI-E3). The welfare benefits of strategic behavior by Russia is thus relatively small,
at most $22 billion, when the U.S. is in the Protocol. When the U.S. is out, the welfare gains are
$147 billion in the competitive case, $239 billion in the myopic monopoly case, and $267 billion in
the intertemporal monopoly case (with GEMINI-E3); i.e., the gains from strategic behavior rise to as
much as $120 billion. The time path of welfare effects shows somewhat greater benefits for the myopic
monopoly case in earlier years than in the intertemporal monopoly case. Banking (intertemporal
optimization) results in greater benefits in later years at the expense of benefits in earlier years.
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Figure 8: Welfare (Left) and terms of trade (Right) effects with the US out
6 The impacts of CDM credit availability
In this section, we assess the sensitivity of our modeling results to assumptions about CDM potential in
developing countries. Since we are interested here mainly in its impact in Russia’s strategic behavior,
we show results only for the “inter-temporal optimization case”.
As shown on Figure 9, in the short run the permit prices are relatively insensitive to the quantity
of CDM whatever the MAC curves for Russia and Ukraine and the demand curves of the remaining
Annex B countries. In the long run, however, the prices of carbon permits tend to go down when more
CDM is available. This is particularly true when we use the demand curves generated by GEMINI-E3.
Since the demand curves are relatively steep in GEMINI-E3, carbon prices decrease more rapidly when
the demand of permits is reduced. When the U.S. is out of the Protocol, the demand estimated with
GEMINI-E3 is even more inelastic to prices in the long run. As a result, the assumptions about CDM
tend to have an even larger impact on the price of carbon emission permits (Figure 10).
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7 Conclusion
The emissions allotment under the Kyoto Protocol produced a situation where Russia and Ukraine
are likely to have permits in excess of their business-as-usual emissions for decades. This means that
these countries are likely to be the dominant suppliers of permits in a trading system. This dominant
supplier position gives these countries monopoly power, which can be exercised to increase permits
revenues. A proper analysis of the optimal strategic decision requires both an intertemporal model
and a representation of the tradeoff faced between permit and energy market revenue, as higher carbon
prices in Annex B results in lower world oil prices, a major Russian export. More broadly one needs to
consider the overall terms of trade and macroeconomic impacts that result from higher carbon prices
in Annex B should Russia behave strategically in the permit market. In this paper, we developed a
dynamic model to represent Russia and Ukraine’s strategic interest. We parameterized the model using
the MIT-EPPA and GEMINI-E3 CGE models that fully capture the trade macroeconomic effects of
permit sales restrictions. The main results of our analysis can be summarized as follows:
• With the withdrawal of the U.S. from the Kyoto Protocol, Russia and Ukraine have a much
stronger incentive for strategic behavior. The discounted present value of their gains through
2040 from permit sales are multiplied by as much as a factor of six (GEMINI-E3 case) if they
intertemporally optimize and strategically limit permit sales compared with myopic competitive
market solution.
• The small gains from strategic behavior when the U.S. is in the Protocol are due to two factors.
One reason for this small effect is that the growth in emissions is such that there is little benefit
from banking of emissions, i.e., the Kyoto forever constraint with the U.S. in the Protocol results
in little incentive for temporal reallocation. The other reason is that with the U.S. in the Protocol
the energy market effects are that much larger and the lost energy revenue largely offsets the
gains in revenue from restricting permits.
• The availability of CDM credits would weaken Russia and Ukraine’s market power to some degree.
However, the specific impact remains highly speculative. One reason is that the potential supply
of CDM credits is uncertain because the rules that will govern admissible credits have not been
finalized, and decisions about admissibility are likely to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. We
further found a significant difference in the CDM effects even among the cases we considered
that depended on the different elasticities of demand for permits as estimated with the two CGE
models. Notably, GEMINI-E3, the model with more inelastic demand, showed a greater effect of
CDM credits on reducing Russia and Ukraine’s market power, and this effect was greatest in the
case where the U.S. is not part of the Protocol. This may partly reflect the fact that it excludes
the Eastern European countries, which offer another source of permit credit supply.
There remain uncertainties in any such calculations because they depend on future growth in
emissions both in the regions likely to be purchasers of permits as well as in those regions likely to be
sellers. These uncertainties stem from our inability to project GDP growth and technological change
with great precision. Moreover, the results we generated require cooperation between Russia and
Ukraine but we were limited to this case because the underlying CGE models do not disaggregate these
countries. We have also looked only at carbon emissions from fossil fuels, and have not considered the
potential for carbon sequestration in forests and agricultural soils or the potential effects of including
the non-CO2 greenhouse gases. Finally, we considered only the cases of Kyoto forever either with or
without the U.S. The strategic decision actually faced by Russia and Ukraine must be made under
uncertainty about if and when the U.S. might enter the agreement, whether and by how much the
Kyoto target might be changed over time, and whether other countries such as China might enter the
17
agreement. These policy uncertainties are in addition to those in emissions growth and in the structure
of demand for permits, which we have tried to capture by parameterizing our dynamic model based
on two different economic models.
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